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ABSTRACT: Amartya Sen and others argue that a distorted form of multiculturalism called plural
monoculturalism fosters a potentially dangerous kind of multiculturalism based on solitarist thinking
supported by fragmentary logic. We explicate the roles played by solitarist thinking, fragmentary logic and
negative identity in defective forms of multiculturalism and argue that genuine multiculturalism is best
understood using what we call particularist logic, pragmatically operating in context, to form the basis for a
diversity of individual identities.
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1(a) INTRODUCTION
Ideally multiculturalism should foster diversity within the unity of a cohesive community.
Instead there is often a tension between various components in the multicultural mix.
Recently some critics of contemporary multiculturalism have suggested that the ideal has
degenerated into plural monoculturalism. This degeneration has occurred in part, we
maintain, because of solitarist thinking, and the use of fragmentary logic to support this
thinking.
It is important to draw a distinction between the descriptive term multicultural
society—which denotes a society that has, as a matter of fact, a plurality of distinct
cultures within it—and multiculturalism, which is a normative strategy to deal with a
multicultural society. While it may be thought that the problems with multiculturalism are
specific to liberal democracies and that alternative political structures may be better able
to manage the necessary unity in a state of multiple cultures, we suggest that this political
point is unhelpful. In dictatorial plural monoculturalist states it has been demonstrated
that “with the passage of time, so-called ‘secular dictatorships’ emerge as nurseries of
religious fanaticism” because “they reinforce traditional allegiances” and “the last
solidarities to survive are the most visceral ones” (Sen 2006, p. 147). The issues with
multiculturalism are not easily solved or resolved by moving from one liberal state to a
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more repressive one which controls dissent. The dissent only gets submerged under the
repressive state. It does not disappear since the dissent is the symptom not the cause of
the problem of dysfunctional multicultural societies. So, we propose to consider the
fundamental problems with making multiculturalism work as they are internal to the state
and individuals within it. Our purpose is not explicitly political even though a
consequence of what we argue may have some political significance.
In this paper we identify a tension between community and individual identity in
plural monoculturalism. We explain how solitarist thinking contributes to a balkanization
of multiple cultured societies by distorting the nature of individual identity. Fragmentary
logic provides the structure to solitarist thinking and we critically evaluate it to determine
its illicit connection to solitarist thinking. Finally, we suggest particularist logic as a
structured way of thinking about a new version of multiculturalism called genuine
multiculturalism.
1(b) THE TENSION BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY IN
PLURAL MONOCULTURALISM
Within liberal democratic versions of multiculturalism, there is a tension between
community and individual autonomy. This tension can be explicated in terms of its
implications for individual identity. There is no doubt that being a member of a particular
community influences the kind of identity that we can have. The typical individual
belongs to at least two different kinds of community. One, he or she is a member of the
moral community; as someone who possesses dignity and moral worth and who is the
bearer of a cluster of human rights. In this sense, she shares the characteristics of a
universal person. Additionally, one is invariably born (or raised) or associated with
particular communities that are characterized by race, linguistic adherence, religion, etc.
These are “partial” communal identities in that they provide a particularist twist to the
universal ideal; one is a Canadian Muslim of Lebanese extraction, for example. Yet who I
am is more than simply a set of collective identities. There must also be an
acknowledgement of my specificity. As Charles Taylor puts it in The Politics of
Recognition, “There is a certain way of being human that is my way of being. I am called
upon to live my life in certain way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life.” If I am not
true to myself, “I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me” (Taylor
1994, p. 30).
The tension occurs in a couple of ways. First, my partial identity is not something
I discover or am given by the circumstances in which I find myself. Context is not the
determinate of my identity. Rather, context supplies the ingredients for me to choose the
content of my individual identity consistent with my identification in the moral
community as an autonomous person. I choose who I will be within the set of
possibilities presented to me. There is thus a tension between the extent to which context
chooses for me and in which I negotiate my own self-determined identity. Second, it is
possible for my partial identity to change over time, developmental stage and
circumstance. There is no solitary and unified identity over time which uniquely
constitutes “me” in a distinctive, essential way. The tension is to determine at any one
point in time my unique existence within a supportive community (without retreat to
some essentialist notion of “self”, “I”, or metaphysically mysterious “ego”). Third, my
2
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identity is not the result of some universal or essential conception of a human. Rather it is
my identity to choose and fashion to some degree.
2. SOLITARIST THINKING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
MULTICULTURALISM
Amartya Sen argues that a distorted form of multiculturalism—plural monoculturalism—
fosters a dangerous one-dimensional solitarist conception of identity. The solitarist
conception of identity is dangerous because “many of the conflicts and barbarities in the
world are sustained through the illusion of a unique and choice less identity” (2006, p.
xv); a conception that has fostered the inaccurate and dangerous “clash of civilizations”
explanation of the tension between cultures. This is inaccurate first because it supposes
that individuals are only identified as individual members of a particular culture, sharing
all and only the characteristics of that culture. Second, this classificatory identity has the
effect of miniaturizing people by accentuating differences. These accentuated differences
can be the basis for violence against any actual or perceived threat to their purity or
security.
On this account, there is no open door, mid-point or appeasement between
cultures. The clash of civilizations is seen as belligerent since “the imposition of an
allegedly unique identity is often a crucial component of the ‘martial art’ of fomenting
sectarian confrontation” (Sen 2006, p. xiii) and “[V]iolence is fomented by the imposition
of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people, championed by proficient artisans
of terror.” (2) Unique individual identity which provides an open set of diverse
possibilities that should be favoured in a multicultural pluralism is replaced by a
reduction to a single, unchanging essence of what it is to be a Moslem, Gentile or Jew.
Yet, even these group identities are constantly going through a process of development,
self-evaluation and re-invention. None of these groups remains static or unchanging. It is
as if the main claim of multiculturalism, namely that individual diversity could flourish
and grow within a flexible and adaptive unified community, is thought to be unattainable
unless individuals are reduced to indistinguishable, universal cultural entities.
A viable multiculturalism is one in which individuals, through an autonomous
process of self-creation are able to carve out a unique identity for themselves, while
respecting the efforts of others to do the same. Individual autonomy cannot be developed
in a vacuum. It needs the support and nurturing of family, in the private domain, and the
support of society and culture in the public domain. The prisoner is not a self-chooser. He
accepts the choices of others when to eat, what to wear, where to stay, when to sleep, and
so on. His inability to develop in this environment as an autonomous individual is often
the reason why prisoners fail to adapt to their new environment of choice when they are
released after long periods of incarceration. This process of autonomous individuation is
best envisaged as one pole of a process that has as its other pole identifying and codifying
universal norms to protect the security of the community.
Consider a possible concrete example. Suppose we ponder the situation of a
woman born in Malaysia during the 1970s. Now, Malaysia is comprised of three major
ethnicities: Malay, Chinese and Indian. In 1969, it adopted a policy that made Malay the
official culture and language of the nation with Islam the official religion. Malaysia
privileged, through a form of affirmative action, the lot of the indigenous Malays, the
Bumiputras. Bumiputras were given a fast track to a university education and offered
3
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preferential treatment when forming businesses, tax breaks etc. in order to elevate the
Malays into economic parity with the other two main ethnic groups. Now, consider
someone in Malaysia born into a Christian Indian family (i.e., a minority community in
Malaysia which in this case is predominantly Hindu). To whom and to what do her
loyalties lie? In what ways do her Malaysian, Christian, Female, Indian identities
comprise her? We have not exhausted her classifications or affiliations by any means; she
could also belong to a professional organization like the Bar Association and be a
committed Animal Rights activist. Her identity is hers to choose within the open set of
possibilities presented to her. As such it is not pre-determinately fixed but rather always
individually partial.
The issue at hand is the tension between interaction and isolation. Plural
monoculturalism occurs when two or more styles, cultures, or traditions co-exist but there
is little or no interaction between them; there is a sense of sequestering. Affirming that
one belongs to a particular community and deciding to stay within its parameters is an act
of freedom, but so is the decision to move beyond its parameters. Solitarist thinking
encourages us to focus on only the first of these options. Plural monoculturalism assumes
that a person’s relation to the wider civil community is mediated through the culture of
one’s family. Hence, Sen sees the current Labour policy in Britain as misguided because
it sees “citizens of immigrant communities and specific religious ethnicities first, and
only through that membership see themselves as British, in a supposed federation of
communities. It is not hard to understand that this uniquely fractional view of any nation
would make it more open to the preaching and cultivation of sectarian violence.” (2006,
p. 164) This is consistent with Sen’s criticism of religious or faith schools because they
encourage a fragmentary perception of the demands of living in a desegregated society.
For Sen, education is not simply to immerse children in an old, inherited ethos, but to
develop the ability to reason, make appropriate choices and to live examined lives.
Stanley Fish’s (1997) critical discussion of what he calls “boutique
multiculturalism” and “strong multiculturalism” is another example of someone trying to
deal with the plural monoculturalism foisted by solitarist thinking ending up in a selfdefeating position. Fish’s point, we take it, is that the appeal to tolerance to mediate
between isolated communities is founded on failure because for a culture to retain its
cultural integrity, it has to have some non-negotiable core values. This is clearly an
essentialist position. It makes little sense to expect that core values are open to
modification or negotiation, making those who adhere to them intolerant of change; i.e., it
assumes that each culture has an identified or fixed specifiable core set of values which
form its essence. For Fish strong multiculturalism will “want to accord a deep respect to
all cultures at their core” such that “each has the right to form its own identity and
nourish its own sense of what is rational and humane.” However, there is a problem that
he notices, namely (Fish 1999, pp. 60-61):
the strong multiculturalist is best understood as holding some sort of essentialist position since
tolerance is required to play the role of buffering cultures that are at root mutually exclusive of
each other. For the strong multiculturalist, the first principle is not rationality or some other
supracultural universal but tolerance. . . [However] . . . The trouble with stipulating tolerance as
your first principle, however, is that you cannot possibly be faithful to it because sooner or later
the culture whose core values you are tolerating will reveal itself to be intolerant at that same core.
The distinctiveness that marks it as unique and self-defining will resist the appeal of moderation or
incorporation into a larger whole.
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On Fish’s (1999, p. 61) questionable account of the story, the strong multiculturalist
holds a position which is ultimately self-defeating as he faces a destructive dilemma:
either he stretches his toleration so that it extends to the intolerance residing at the heart of a
culture he would honor, in which case tolerance is no longer his guiding principle, or he condemns
the core intolerance of that culture (recoiling in horror when Khomeini calls for the death of
Rushdie), in which case he is no longer according it respect at the point where distinctiveness is
most obviously at stake.

Fish (ibid.) concludes that strong multiculturalists “will grab the second handle of this
dilemma . . . and thereby reveal himself not to be a strong multiculturalist at all”.Since
Fish is, by his own admission, an avowed uniculturalist or monoculturalist, it is not
surprising that he should discover in the fragmented nature of the structure or logic of
multiculturalism some inherent defects. Fish has hooked himself by taking the solitarist
bait and abandoning the possibility of genuine multiculturalism in order to avoid the
problems with boutique and strong multiculturalism. He has thrown out the fish with the
fish water. Fish believes that the failure of solitarist thinking supported by fragmentary
logic is the failure of any version of multiculturalism, whereas we do not. He identifies
some serious logical problems in the relationship between tolerance and
multiculturalism’s ideals or goals but he has failed to understand the more fundamental
problems of a way of thinking and the defective logic that supports it.
3. NEGATIVE IDENTITY AND SOLITARIST THINKING
Another way that solitarist thinking serves to potentially destroy the possibility of
genuine multiculturalism is through the use of negative identity. Negative identity occurs
when one cultural or religious identity is formed and individuated or authenticated on the
basis of a rejection of another; the Arab Moslem cannot be an Arab Christian. The
Christian has to be viewed as the enemy of the Moslem in order for the Moslem to
believe in their unique identity—not someone or something else. The basis for personal
identity as a function of one’s ethical identity is the same basis for intolerance. Without
the intolerance there is thought to be no identity since identity involves some exclusivity.
The identity of an individual in this sense is based on what multiculturalism is supposed
to oppose or prevent, namely intolerance. The positive value of multicultural identities is
conflicted by the apparent need for intolerance in order to wall in one’s individual
identity. Fish seems to miss the idea of reciprocity to solve the structural problems he
identifies with defective understandings of multiculturalism. Instead, he opts for the
notion of singular- affiliation: the view that “in every situation, [there is] some one group
that is naturally the preeminent collectivity for her, and she can have no choice in
deciding on the relative importance of her different membership categories.” (1999, p.25)
Solitarist thinking often leads to balkanization and sectarian violence. It is
reductionist in nature, turning “multidimensional human beings into one dimensional
creatures.” (Sen 2006, p. 174) 1 This way of thinking gives false justification to the
1

The Existentialists make this point well. Nietzsche, for example, calls the retreat from our unique
existence “bad conscience”, an attempt to return to the mob mentality and its subsequent slave morality.
"The illusion of singular identity . . . serves the violent purpose of those orchestrating such confrontations."
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outcome. The generation of the illusion of unique (negative) identity appeals to those
who are in the business of fomenting violence and the cultivated delusion of singularity.
One of Sen’s major criticisms of plural monoculturalism is that it sees the protection and
preservation of diverse communities as an end in itself, where the end is not the
communities but the developing individual and subsequent cosmopolitan community.
Instead Sen sees communities instrumentally. Communities are only important to the
extent that they provide the context from which an individual derives or chooses her
partial identities. Communities are what make social identities possible. As Appiah
(2005, p. 107) puts it “we make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our
culture and society.”
Each of us has to determine what constitute our relevant identities and to give a
relative weight to these different identities since the importance of a particular (partial)
identity will depend on the social context. Not all identities need to have durable
importance; rather they can have a fleeting, contingent existence. It is this notion of
identity that multicultural states need to support in order to remain consistent with
genuine multiculturalism.
4. FRAGMENTARY LOGIC AND SOLITARIST-INDUCED VIOLENCE
Sen argues that conceptual confusion hampering an individual’s ability to think and
creating solitarist-induced violence can occur as a result of the use of an illegitimate kind
of reasoning he calls fragmentary logic such that:
The martial art of fostering violence draws on some basic instincts and uses them to crowd out the
freedom to think and the possibility of composed reasoning. But it also draws [we have to
recognize] on a kind of logic—a fragmentary logic. The specific identity that is separated out for
special action is, in most cases, a genuine identity of the person to be recruited: a Hutu is indeed a
Hutu, a “Tamil tiger” is clearly a Tamil, a Serb is not an Albanian, and a gentile German with a
mind poisoned by Nazi philosophy is certainly a gentile German. What is done to turn that sense
of self-understanding into a murderous instrument is (1) to ignore the relevance of all other
affiliations and associations, and (2) to redefine the demands of the “sole” identity in a particularly
belligerent form. (2006, pp. 175-176)

An inaccurate picture of the individual is fostered by the use of a questionable
classification to arm a version of guilt by association. A defective offspring is created,
supposing that the individual’s identity is captured by the classification of a group, in
many cases a discredited group. All the other aspects of the individual’s identity are
deliberately ignored to create the conceptual confusion of reference necessary to attempt
to justify violence against this particular individual. As in the use of propaganda during
wartime, the particular individual disappears and the faceless enemy takes his or her
place; this enemy is easier to simplify into one univocal category of enemy threat. This
forces individuals into singular boxes of identity, thereby deliberately negating the
relevance of one’s plural social relations. This sets up the “all or none,” “us versus them”
problem of black and white thinking common in situations of unwarranted aggression.
Fragmentary logic is an integral part of the structure and reasoning of solitarist thinking,

Similarly, in Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger claims that a certain kind of calculative thinking produced
the atom bomb and its threat to humanity and that without this thinking the threat would not exist.
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helping to foster a false sense of the authority or acceptability of this defective thinking
about individuals in a multicultural society. At the same time, it seems to identify a kind
of singularity or uniqueness to individuals which is best identified under another logical
structure, namely particularist logic.
It is possible, of course, for some cultural groups to remain apart from other
cultures in a social context of mutual respect and accord, as Professor Hitchcock pointed
out in his discussion of our paper during its presentation. 2 So, for example, the
differences between the Mennonites and other groups in the same social state may be
pronounced and significant. However, their separation is not one that necessarily sets up
the conditions of the “us versus them” problem or any ensuing aggression because their
identity is not built on negative identity and the solitarist thinking supported by
fragmentary logic characteristic of more confrontational alternatives. There is an
accommodation of so-called “old order,” “new order” “reform” and other forms of
Mennonite cultural identities, all of which seem to co-exist. This suggests an
accommodation to change and diversity of individual identity within the Mennonite
community, a diversity not based on negative identity and the antagonism that can
establish as the basis for solidarity.
Rejecting the impediment of solitarist thinking helps us to better deal conceptually
with diversity within unity. One way of thinking of what Sen is up to is to see him trying
to juggle two different balls at the same time: notions like “moral agent” and “human
being” seem to presuppose a universalist conception of the individual, but such a
conception cannot be the whole story since our individual lives (our biographies) are also
the result of our partial (social) identities. The trick is to not see us as having only one
partial identity but as a composite of a bunch of partial identities. That is, the Universalist
conception of the individual (that which provides the unity of the self and is the bearer of
universal human rights, etc.) must be coupled with a story that takes into account my
partial identities. 3 Accordingly any account of multiculturalism must be non-essentialist.
Not only the emphasis but the perspective placed on the interpretation of the identity I
create is up to me. It is my narrative. It functions to describe the world as I see it and the
place that I see myself occupying in it. This allows for the dynamic of cosmopolitan
communities which is the avowed goal of genuine multiculturalism.

2
3

Hitchcock footnote
Charles Taylor (1994, pp. 38-39) delineates the problem well in his "The Politics of Recognition”:
the development of the modern notion of identity, has given rise to a politics of difference. There
is, of course, a Universalist basis to this . . . Everyone should be recognized for his or her unique
identity. But recognition here means something else. With the politics of equal dignity, what is
established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with
the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual
or group, their distinctness from everyone else. . . The politics of difference is full of
denunciations of discrimination and refusals of second-class citizenship. This gives the principle
of universal equality a point of entry within the politics of dignity. But once inside, as it were, its
demands are hard to assimilate to that politics. For it asks that we give acknowledgment and status
to something that is not universally shared. Or, put otherwise, we give due acknowledgment only
to what is universally present--everyone has an identity--through recognizing what is peculiar to
each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgment of specificity.
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5. A SOLUTION TO FRAGMENTARY AND SOLITARIST THINKING IN
PARTICULARIST LOGIC
In order to understand particularist logic and how it differs from fragmentary logic in the
determination of what we call genuine multiculturalism, it is useful to consider
Gadamer’s notion of authentic conversation. According to Gadamer, participants can
leave behind their self-preoccupations as they give themselves over to the to-and-fro of
the discussion. What becomes central is the subject matter under discussion so that the
locus of the activity is the “between” made concrete in the issue of the truth of the matter
under discussion. Individual egos fall away and all the matter that matters dominates;
Gadamer calls this “total mediation,” an unfolding event through which people and the
matters at hand come to have their concrete identity. In this situation there is a merging of
distinct horizons of the understanding in order to reach an agreement about the truth of
something that matters so that “[T]o be in a conversation, however, means to be beyond
oneself, to think with the other and to come back to oneself as if to another”
(Michelfelder & Palmer 1989, p. 110). 4
Fragmentary logic, on the other hand, suggests that individuals are “unrelated” or
“separated from some initially complete whole.” So, they are fragmented from something
universal. However, as Sen uses the phrase it refers to a way of isolating one aspect of an
individual’s identity and then using this separated identity to segregate her from other
members of society. Just as it was irrelevant to isolate a woman’s biological identity from
her social identity, so it is equally irrelevant and irresponsible to segregate and isolate any
individual in a multicultural context. This kind of segregation is part of the solitarist’s
thinking and as such a mistake. As we noted earlier, a particularly devastating form of
this mistake can be the use of negative identity to foment aggression.
We argue that a form of logical reasoning we call particularist logic is the best to
accommodate the non-solitarist version of genuine multiculturalism. The process of this
logic is, first, dialogical and conversational. Its constituent components include selfindividuating diversity (as this determines relationships of identity), non-theoretic
practical consensus, and reciprocity. Second, practitioners should adhere to both a
Principle of Charity and a Principle of Communal Resolution. The first principle
obligates practitioners to accept a condition of openness and an attempt to reach a
position based on fairness and respect for the views of others with whom one does not

4

The concept of a fusion of interpretive horizons approximates Donald Davidson’s principle of interpretive
charity. Arguably, Gadamer’s position is superior. It demands continual recognition of the otherness of
other perspectives, even as it denies the possibility of a point of view totally alien and hence unintelligible
to us. Davidson’s argument is too strong; it minimises the very idea of conceptual schema and with it the
possibility of acknowledging perspectives deeply unlike ours. Interpreting others with an eye to
maximizing the truth of their beliefs and the rationality of their actions might well mean assimilating their
world to ours in implausible and even damaging ways. Like particularist logic the focus is not on the
argument in isolation from the arguers bringing about a change in belief or a resolution to a controversy but
rather that there is an involvement of the argument and the arguers in a context in which their relations are
intertwined in a dialogical process to achieve a result. (It is useful to contrast Davidson’s use of the
Principle of Charity, the idea is that we should “count them with us” to Grady’s Principle of Humanity
introduces the invocation to “count them intelligible.”) As a result of the application of these principles the
player and the game are interconnected, arguer and argument are not separable or detached from each
individual participant.
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necessarily agree, while the second principle places an obligation to a principled process
that involves the continuation of attempts to reach a resolution, even if such a resolution
is not of equal value to all or is based on an incomplete or partial set of support for the
conclusion. Third, particularist logic adherents “proceed in the face of conflict and
disagreement on fundamental matters (Sunstein 2000, p. 98). As such, even if there is no
obvious consensus, for example, on the issues of (i) the essential nature of human beings,
so-called (ii) “hard cases” and/or (iii) first principles, it is possible to produce an
argument. Negotiation can proceed to a resolution or conclusion without prior consensus
or with silence on these issues or open questions. Finally, particularist logic is contextsensitive, operating at the level of “greatest particularity” and “it enlists silence, on
certain basic questions, as a device for producing convergence despite disagreement,
uncertainty, limits of time and capacity, and heterogeneity” (Sunstein 2000, pp. 98-99).
Like conductive reasoning, the premises of an argument employing particularist
logic lead us to the conclusion by giving us some particular reasons—in this context,
under these covering conditions—to accept the conclusion. Unlike inductive or deductive
reasoning, there is no condition that the premises are inferentially or deductively related
to the conclusion. So, for example, one person may accept the premise P1: Human beings
have a natural ethical obligation to protect to protect species in the natural world, while
other people might accept the premise P2: Human beings have an inherent need to
prevent ecological instability in the ecosystem of which they are a part, while still others
might accept the premise P3: Human beings may find previously unknown species which
could provide valuable medicines to cure current and future human diseases. The
individuals who accept P1 use it to support the conclusion that C: It is important for
human beings to protect endangered species in the natural environment. However, while
other people accept P2 as support for C, they do not accept P1 as support for C. Still
others accept P3 but not P1 or P2 as support for C. The reasons in support of the
conclusion are separate from each other but what holds them all together converging on
the same conclusion is the pragmatic adherence to the Principles of Charity and
Communal Resolution, or the need to reach a practical resolution. There is no deep
principle binding all the supporters of the conclusion. There need not be some
fundamental theory about the essential nature of argument or human nature or
psychology that holds among all members of the group to reach a resolution.
To suppose that any of these possibilities is necessary is to make a fundamental
error, namely a category mistake; to suppose that in addition to the set of soldiers
composing the regiment there is something else that identifies a separate spatio-temporal
existence or metaphysical entity along with them, when in fact there is no such ghostly
entity. The proponent of P1 need not necessarily have to understand any fundamental or
deep theory behind the reasoning of the proponent of P2 or P3. Whether or not someone
other than the arguer accepts the authority or assumptions behind these premises, such as
authoritative appeals to “only someone from my culture could truly understand the
significance of this attire or headwear” is separate from and may be irrelevant to “I don’t
agree with the authority behind the wearing of this attire” but “I can (consistently) agree
that your reason is a good piece of support for this conclusion” (the same conclusion
which I support for a different reason).
It will be useful to consider two objections in order to clarify our thinking on
particularist logic. First, particularity logic is not a case of what has been called full
particularity, a “phenomenon (that) occurs when people agree on a result without
9
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agreeing on any kind of supporting rationale” (Sunstein 2000, p. 99). Second,
particularist logic is not a case of rationalization, where the conclusion is decided without
any reasoning and the reasoning occurs after the fact of this decision. In particularist
logic, an inability to agree on some particular reasons for supporting a conclusion is not a
blanket inability to agree on any reasons. As well, in particularist logic, there is the
recognition of reciprocity in reaching a consensus or agreeing on a supported conclusion.
Put differently, although someone does not agree with P1 in support of C, there is a
realization that it is important for this person to respect the integrity of the person who
does support C with P1 because reciprocally the other person will be similarly implicated
to accept the importance for someone else to have P2 serve as conductive support for the
conclusion C.
In particularist logic, reasoning and negotiation operate together. Reasoning is not
an independent means of securing agreement in negotiations but rather negotiation
principles are inherent in the process. The form of this logic is a loose version of
conductive arguing and the structure is based on a variation of what is called incompletely
theorized agreements in a legal context (Sunstein 2000, pp. 99-100). Unlike proponents
of the incompletely theorized agreements, it is not founded on any essentialist theory and
does not claim that “in social life, people reason in ways that grow out of the particular
role in which they find themselves. They know what actions are permissible, and what
actions are off limits only because of their role.” (Sunstein 2000, p. 100) Instead, in
particularist logic, the created identity of any individual arguer is polymorphous and
contextually contingent, not fixed by some determinate role conditions. The expectations
of an arguer cannot be aligned with the essential conditions defining a role of parent,
student, doctor or whatever. The problem isn’t just about a lack of any determinate
theory; it is also a problem of the lack of any determinate parameters for the arguer. We
cannot rely on the essential characteristics of human nature, social role determinants or
any deep metaphysical theory to provide the core of a possible agreement. Instead,
particularist logic recognizes the importance of negotiation and reciprocity as important
parts of the process of consensus reaching or conclusion acceptance. It is a dialogical
process, a conversation.
In a multicultural society, a major contentious point of dispute or controversy may
be C: There are good reasons to interfere with individual liberty of choice of dress or
attire. In this case, we are not under any condition to define personal identity in exactly
the same way for everyone in order to provide viable reasons in support of the
conclusion. We are also not under any obligation to agree on particular cases of (a)
clearly wrongful interference with individual liberty and (b) particular cases of agreed
acceptable interference with individual liberty. Instead, we need to agree to negotiate to a
conclusion on the basis of respect for individually diverse reasons or considerations and
reciprocity among arguers. What counts as a piece of support for the conclusion is
negotiated through a reciprocal relationship of respect for individual integrity. This
means that in different contexts the negotiated support may differ for the same conclusion
providing relevant but multifaceted support for the same general conclusion or
agreement. The Principle of Charity and the Principle of Communal Resolution are
implicit in any such argument. So, one individual might argue using P5: Respecting
individual liberty requires only a clear and imminent threat to some identified individual
in order to interfere with an individual’s choice of attire, while someone else might argue
for the same conclusion using the premise P6: Our tradition clearly provides no support
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for individual liberty in choice of dress or attire. While P5 is relevant support for C,
independently of whether I accept it as support for C, P6 cannot be relevant support for
C. These two principles, combined with a commitment to reciprocity and mutual respect
for individuals, serve to induce agreement or concurrence without a formal or legal
accord when it comes to what constitutes—in particular circumstances—relevantly
similar parallels to gain acceptance for analogies. Hence, without any substantive theory,
accepted definition or well-supported principle, it is still possible to agree that –for
present purposes—sex discrimination is like race discrimination in all the ways necessary
to achieve concurrence on the conclusion that follows this reasoning.
Particularist logic does not work like fragmentary logic to separate and categorize
individuals from their self-chosen identities in order to foster acceptable violence. Instead
it recognizes individual differences and conflicts or disagreements between individuals
while attempting to forge social consensus among them in the acceptance of conclusions
of conductive arguments.
6. CONCLUSION: PARTICULARIST LOGIC AND GENUINE
MULTICULTURALISM
Traditional reasoning assumes intersubjective substitutions, universal existence
conditions and affirmations of identity over time (the Identity of Indiscernibles, for
example). These features of traditional logic make it amenable to use in solitarist thinking
in multicultural societies. There is a universal affirmation of univocal identity required in
traditional logic with ambiguity, equivocation and vagueness; demons that need to be
exorcised from the discourse. A plurality of values is found in a diverse and disparate set
of particular individuals. What can traditional logic say about them? How can traditional
logic negotiate on the basis of irreducible differences to achieve consensus or
concurrence on a single conclusion or resolution? An example of this kind of
straightjacket can easily be found in the literature about multiculturalism with the
invocation of logical entailment problems.
Particularist logic instead focuses on the affirmation of different and diverse
reasons in favour of the same conclusion. It does not assert the necessity that the audience
must share anything but a few minimalist points of affinity. There are no deep universal
theories or principles behind its use; it is not reductionist. It cannot appeal to uniform
repetition of results but the openness of the procedure helps to secure agreements in
support of a controversial conclusion. So, individual identities can remain secure in their
diversity. There is no need to compromise individuality to conformity with a universal or
ideal, rigid designator.
In multiculturalism, there is an identification of informed and considered
reciprocity as the basis for mutual respect and acknowledgement of individual
differences. For example, the recent immigrant needs to identify what is important about
the new culture she is entering or the new society she has chosen. She needs to
understand what can be challenged and even rejected. Her relationship is negotiated
reciprocity without the solitarist requirement that she shed significant aspects of her
created identity. No culture, society or other human creation is static or immune to
changing its invented traditions or procedures. So, the advice is (Sen 2006, p. 41)
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the more you steep yourself in the culture of the host country the more you will be able to steep
yourself in your own—the more an immigrant feels that his own culture is respected, the more
open he will be to the host country” and she can legitimately ask “what minimum equipment is
everyone supposed to possess and what may be legitimately challenged or rejected?

The open framework provided by non-solitarist thinking, structured by particularist logic,
allows this kind of reciprocal relationship to occur. Individuality and identity is preserved
while receptive to various new developments and options. Individuals are in positions of
negotiation. What is possible for this individual is reciprocally possible for others as well.
Instead of an “us/them” dichotomy requiring a kind of solitarist solution, there is an
informed and coherent growth of both the individual and the society she inhabits. Instead
of constriction and limitation, the social/cultural space is capacious and enlivened to new
possibilities, while the integrity of individuals is protected.
In conclusion, some thoughts about the Rushdie case, the writer who in his
writing offended a fundamentalist reading of a religious text, may prove illuminating
(Sunstein 2000, p. 100). The case exemplifies the lack of the ingredients that go into
genuine multiculturalism. Instead of openness to negotiation, there was a steadfast
reinforcement of a literalist or monoculturalist approach. No negotiation was possible
despite the offer made by the writer to attempt a negotiated resolution. Solidarity was
taken to be threatened by the existence of the writings in the book. This conflict between
the writer’s intentions and the antagonist’s unflinching negative interpretation is the
hallmark of negative identity. Violence was threatened in order to preserve a solitary idea
of uniform religious identity. Rushdie was nothing other than a failed Muslim. He wasn’t
a fiction writer, British immigrant, etc., merely an apostate since all his other possible
sources of identity were obliterated as having no relevance or significance. It seemed
clear in the distorted, fragmentary logic of the antagonist that violence was the only
redress to such a manifest insult. The only resolve to a failed believer is death which is a
rather permanent way of eliminating the dissenting individual. A genuine
multiculturalism must afford the possibility of avoiding this kind of solitarist thinking in
the structure of the relationships of individuals within its domain.
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses is, in many ways, a kind of mediation on the nature of
the self. In the novel, for example, migration can be viewed as a metaphor for death and
rebirth. The novel explores ways that the self, embedded in a set of cultural and linguistic
practices reconstitutes itself into a new culture. This kind of interpretation, of course, is
not in accord with solitarist thinking supported by fragmentary logic.
link to commentary
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